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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparative studies of economic inequality focus mainly on income inequality and tend 
to treat wealth inequality only cursorily. In the past two decades major survey studies 
have combined international, intra-national and inter-temporal income distribution data to 
analyse the long term evolution of global income inequality (Lindert, 2000; Bourguignon 
and Morrisson, 2002; Milanovic, 2005; Milanovic et al., 2008). Compared to this 
achievement, research on wealth inequality has been modest (Davies and Shorrocks, 
2000; Sierminska et al., 2006; Davies, 2008, Maestri et al., 2013). Given the great 
limitations of the available wealth data, the recent attempt of Davies et al. (2009) to 
construct a global distribution of household wealth, based on wealth tax and household 
survey data around the year 2000, is courageous and necessary to stimulate further 
research into comparative wealth inequality. 
Despite the international variation in wealth concepts, definitions, coverage and 
estimation methods, the literature is in broad agreement that two things generally hold. 
First, wealth inequality is bigger than income inequality. Wealth concerns a stock, which 
allows for indefinite accumulation, whereas income earnings consist of flows which are 
naturally limited. In addition, while it is virtually impossible to have negative income, it 
is possible to have a net debt position, thereby enlarging the inequality potential of the 
wealth distribution in comparison to the income distribution (Davies and Shorrocks, 
2000: p. 607).  
Second, there seems to be widespread agreement that income and wealth 
inequality are positively correlated. The economic logic is simple and runs in both 
directions: high income earners have more opportunities to save part of their income and 
accumulate wealth assets. Wealth conversely, generates additional income. Davies et al. 
employ this logic to directly infer wealth inequality estimates from income inequality 
estimates for the many countries for which wealth data are absent, assuming a fixed ratio 
of the Lorenz ordinates for income and wealth distributions (Davies et al., 2009: p. 21).  
This research note probes into the supposed cross-country correlation between 
income and wealth inequality. A first indication that this correlation may be rather weak - 
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at least where it concerns private wealth -, follows from an inspection of the limited set of 
countries for which Davies et al. were able to collect ‘hard data’ on both the income and 
wealth distribution (p. 17). Figure 1 plots the Gini coefficients of wealth inequality from 
these 18 countries against the gross household income inequality Gini coefficients from 
the WIID database used by Davies et al.1 Figure 1 does not show any correlation. Perhaps 
even more surprisingly, the four countries at the top end of wealth inequality are 
Denmark (0.808), the US (0.801), Switzerland (0.803) and Sweden (0.742). Three of 
them are typical examples of Western European welfare states with low (Switzerland), or 
even very low (Denmark, Sweden), levels of income inequality, in contrast to their 
comparative wealth inequality levels. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Wealth inequality (horizontal axis) versus gross household income inequality 
(vertical axis), c. 2000: 18 countries for which ‘hard data’ is available 
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Sources: Davies et al. 2009, Table 7 and 9; World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008, gross 
household income inequality, national coverage, same year or nearest available, 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ (accessed 21-03-2010). Countries included 
are: Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
 
                                                
1 Germany and Indonesia were excluded because there was no gross household income inequality estimate. 
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Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland are part of the nine ‘Rhineland welfare states’, also 
dubbed ‘coordinated market economies’ or ‘social market economies’ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001: pp. 18-21; Pontusson, 2006: pp. 3-6). Together with Austria, Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Finland, these welfare states are characterized by socio-
economic policies that prioritize employment protection, income redistribution and 
encompassing systems of social security based on political cooperation between various 
stakeholders in the labour market. These policies have contributed to the notable contrast 
of their income inequality levels with ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or ‘English-speaking countries’ 
such as the UK and US (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007). But why does this contrast not 
appear in the available wealth inequality estimates?  
As long as reliable and comparable wealth distribution data remain so scarce, it 
will be hard to give a conclusive answer to this question. But the data that is available 
invites speculation. This research note provides some hypothetical explanations of the 
puzzle of the Rhineland welfare states. In section 2 we review the estimates available for 
the nine countries and discuss the major discrepancies in the data. We argue that the 
tentative evidence suggests that wealth inequality in Rhineland welfare states is much 
higher than could be assumed on the basis of their income inequality levels. In section 3 
we discuss possible causes. We hypothesize that publicly funded life time income 
security, which is typical for Rhineland welfare states, simultaneously enhances private 
debt and wealth creation, thus skewing the wealth distribution, while the redistributive 
taxes required to finance social security are targeting income at progressive rates, thus 
reducing income inequality. Section 4 concludes that, this being the case, we should be 
careful in relying on the supposed income-wealth inequality correlation to construct 
global wealth inequality estimates. 
 
 
2. WEALTH INEQUALITY IN RHINELAND WELFARE STATES: WHAT LITTLE DO WE KNOW? 
 
The international comparability of the wealth inequality estimates of Rhineland welfare 
states is blurred by many factors. Here we will only briefly address some of the major 
                                                                                                                                            
available (see UNU-WIDER, WIID V2.0c May 2008). 
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issues (see also Maestri et al.: [4-11]). The available estimates are usually based on the 
concept of net private household worth, which includes financial assets such as stocks, 
bonds and private saving accounts; non-financial assets such as primary residences, real 
estate, vehicles and other durables; and liabilities such as home-secured mortgage debt, 
private loans and other debts. Net worth refers to the sum of all assets, less the sum of all 
liabilities. Some important economic assets are often missing, however. One of these is 
people’s individual stake in collective pension savings (the value of which is often hard 
to assess on an individual basis) and other public funds allocated to an individual’s 
education or health care provision. Especially in Rhineland welfare states, where these 
public arrangements are well-developed, the concept of ‘private net worth’ captures only 
part of the total wealth citizens can dispose of during their lifetimes. Another factor is 
that the reporting of personal equity in firms is often hard to assess and, therefore, tends 
to be incomplete. We will return to these issues in section 3.   
 The private wealth inequality level estimates we discuss below are presented in 
Table 1. All figures refer to a year close to 2000. We will briefly discuss the deviations in 
these estimates, particularly between those of Davies et al. and the much higher figures of 
several other studies. 
For Sweden Davies et al. (2009) report a Gini coefficient of wealth inequality of 
0.74, based on balance sheets, excluding non-financial assets. However, the Luxembourg 
Wealth Study (LWS henceforth) reports a Gini of 0.89 (Sierminska et al., 2006), based on 
sample surveys of net household wealth supplemented with information from wealth tax 
registers. Klevmarken (2006) finds a Gini of 0.86 using comparable data which largely 
supports the LWS figure. Moreover, Swedish studies stress problems in assessing 
households’ foreign wealth and private equity in closely-held companies, which is often 
missing in wealth registrations (Roine and Waldenström, 2009: pp. 159-162). 
 For Germany there is also a substantial gap between the Davies et al. Gini (0.67) 
and the LWS Gini (0.78). The Davies at al. figure is derived from fairly complete data 
from wealth tax registers. The LWS figure is based on samples from socio-economic 
panel surveys. Frick and Grabka arrive at a figure close to the LWS estimate in their 
recent study of personal wealth inequality (Frick and Grabka, 2009: p. 65). The top 
wealth share estimates for Germany derived from wealth tax records seem to retain an 
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uncertain margin of error (Atkinson, 2008: p. 65), which is illustrated by Mierheim and 
Wicke, who adjusted the wealth inequality estimates for West Germany in 1973 
(Mierheim and Wicke, 1978; Hauser and Stein, 2006). In a painstaking and never 
repeated exercise, the authors corrected for the missing wealth of the richest households 
and used a source which, exceptionally for Germany, also included the value of equity in 
private businesses (which is obviously concentrated in the wealthiest group). The result is 
a Gini of 0.75, considerably higher than calculated without these corrections for 1969 and 
1983 (0.68-0.70). A similar exercise performed for the years around 2000 would arguably 
push the Gini substantially over the 0.80 mark. 
For Finland Davies et al. report a Gini of 0.61 against 0.68 by LWS. According to 
Jäntti wealth inequality in Finland has increased sharply during the economic boom of 
the past decades, starting from a very low level (Jäntti, 2006).  
For Norway, Davies et al. arrive at a Gini of 0.633, based on wealth tax records. 
Ohlsson et al. have argued that the estimate derived from wealth tax records in Norway, 
and similarly in Denmark, suffers from serious underreporting (Ohlsson et al., 2007: p. 
3). In particular, the Norwegian Gini of 0.633 seems too low, since Norwegian real estate 
values are only incorporated up to 30% of their market value. This has led Statistics 
Norway to exclude non-financial assets from their reports altogether. A separate estimate 
of financial asset inequality, excluding net debtors, gives a Gini of 0.75.2 Since a 
substantial number of Norwegian households holds a net debt position, this figure is 
probably an underestimate. 
For Denmark, with a Gini of 0.808 reported by Davies et al. on the basis of wealth 
tax records, the same caveat applies to a lesser extent, since underreporting is less 
obvious here. More material is available from a study in 2009, showing a sharp rise in 
inequality during the preceding years. In 2006, the top 10 % owns 69 % of total wealth. 
Also in Denmark the large share of households with a net debt position (approximately 
40%!) is striking (AE, 2009: pp. 15-17). 
                                                
2 We refer to several sources that are published on the website of Norwegian Statistics which were kindly 
brought to our attention  and explained by the authors Jon Epland and Vidar Pederson, for which we are  
grateful: www.ssb.no/english/subjects/05/03/sbolig_en/ ; www.ssb.no/english/subjects/05/01/ifformue_en/ 
; www.ssb.no/ifhus/arkiv/tab-2001-06-01-14.html 
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For Switzerland, there are no alternatives to the Davies et al. estimate (0.803), as 
far as we know. Yet, other studies show that in 1997 the top 3 % held about half of total 
wealth and the top 0.3 % almost a quarter. The richest 100 Swiss households have 
increased their wealth in the period 1995-2005 by about 450 % (Mäder and Streuli, 
2002), and in 2007, the top 0.2 % held more than a quarter of total wealth and the top 2 % 
about half (EFD, 2010: p. 14). 
Wealth inequality in Belgium is hardly researched as yet. There appears to be a 
complete lack of data. One study reports that in 1979-2005 revenues from wealth have 
increased by 237%, with a sharp concentration at the higher income end of the 
distribution, against a rise of 134% in labour income and 160 % in social benefits 
(Cantillon, 2009: p. 13). But this does not tell us much about the Belgian level of wealth 
inequality.  
For Austria a recent report of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs takes all 
major financial and non-financial components of privately owned wealth into account 
and finds a top 1% share of 34% and a top 10% share of 68% in the year 2002 (Beer et 
al., 2006; Eizinger et al., 2008: pp. 247-248). Exceptionally, this report also includes 
privately-held company assets, more than 90 % of which turn out to be held by the 
wealthiest 1 % of Austrians. Although the study contains insufficient detail to compute a 
Gini coefficient, there is little doubt that the Austrian Gini is much higher than the 0.65 
that was derived by Davies et al. from the Lorenz ordinates of Austrian income 
inequality. A Gini calculation of 0.66 is available for gross financial wealth in 2004, but 
this calculation based on a household survey suffers from the usual underrepresentation 
of the super-rich, and the private wealth sheltered in privately-held foundations is also 
excluded. Inclusion of the latter would raise the Gini to 0.75, but this is still an 
underestimation of the actual figure (Schürz, 2008: p. 68). 
The use of different sources can explain a considerable part of the above 
differences. Davies et al. rely mainly on wealth tax records, whereas the LWS rely on 
household survey sample data (Sierminska et al., 2006: p.6). The latter often include a 
wider range of wealth assets and households from different segments of the overall 
distribution resulting in seemingly consistent higher LWS estimates. Yet, the final case of 
the Netherlands shows that this is not necessarily true.  
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Table 1 
Household wealth inequality and net disposable household income inequality in the Rhineland welfare states, 
the UK and USA, ca. 2000 
 
 Wealth inequality reported by Davies et al. 2009 Alternative wealth inequality estimates Income Gini 
country year Gini Data & method year Gini Data & method Net disposable h.hold income 
Austria 2000 0.646 Inferred from income distribution 2002 >0.75 Household survey (Schürz, 2008) 0.257 
Belgium 2000 0.662 Inferred from income distribution    0.279 
Denmark 1996 0.808 Wealth tax records    0.225 
Finland 1998 0.615 Wealth tax records 1998 0.68 Wealth tax records (LWS) 0.246 
Germany 1998 0.667 Survey of income & consumption 2002 0.78 Survey of income & consumption (LWS) 0.275 
Netherlands 2000 0.650 Inferred from income distribution 1997 0.78 Wealth tax & h.hold surveys (Stat. NL) 0.285 
Norway  2000 0.633 Wealth tax records 2000 0.75 Financial assets (Ohlsson et al. 2007) 0.250 
Sweden 2002 0.742 Wealth tax & h.hold surveys 2002 0.89 Wealth tax & h.hold surveys (LWS) 0.252 
Switzerland 1997 0.803 Wealth tax records 2001 >0.8 Inferred from wealth tax records 0.280 
        
UK 2000 0.697 Wealth tax records 2000 0.66 Household survey 0.347 
USA 2001 0.801 Survey of consumer finances 2001 0.84 Survey of consumer finances (Kennickell 2009) 0.368 
 
Sources: The income inequality estimates are from the Luxembourg Income Study lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm (accessed 23-3-2010) (income inequality). The 
wealth inequality studies are referred to in the Table.  
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Household surveys including self-reported estimates of individual wealth have been 
conducted annually by the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) since 1993. The surveys 
oversample richer households to correct for the usually higher non-response rate among 
the upper wealth strata. The survey includes around 25 wealth items, which is quite 
detailed, but excludes collective pension savings. Despite oversampling, the household 
surveys fail to include the ‘super-rich’ households and suffer from highly fluctuating 
response rates and sample sizes (between 1,000 and 2,500). The estimated top 10% share 
of wealth owners is reported to hold roughly 45-50% of total private wealth. The Gini 
coefficients of net household wealth we computed for the years around 2000 range from 
0.64 to 0.68. These figures are in broad correspondence with the 0.65 reported by Davies 
et al., inferred from Dutch income distribution data. But these estimates of Dutch wealth 
inequality are far too low. 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) has published markedly higher estimates of wealth 
inequality as shown in Table 2. These estimates are based on an almost identical concept 
of net private wealth: excluding collective pension assets, but including the other major 
components. Yet, the CBS figures are based on a combination of income and tax record 
data and sample survey data (the income panel survey including about 250,000 people 
and the social economic panel survey including some 13,000). Because Statistics 
Netherlands adjusts sampling errors with the micro-level data of the wealthier segment of 
the Dutch population from the wealth tax records (including all households owning 
sufficient wealth to pay wealth tax) their estimates incorporate the upper wealth strata 
much more accurately, although tax evasion among the top wealth owners may still lead 
to serious underestimation. 
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Table 2 
Top and Bottom decile shares and Gini Coefficients of Household Wealth according 
to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 1991-2009 
  Top 10% Bottom 10% Gini coefficient 
1991 0.64 -0.015 0.78 
1996 0.61 -0.029 0.78 
1997 0.61 -0.030 0.78 
2006 0.58 -0.049 0.80 
2009 0.58 -0.050 0.82 
Sources: CBS, Inkomen en vermogen 1992-1994; CBS, Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek, July 1996, 
Jaarboek Welvaartsverdeling 1998 en 2000; CBS, Statline. Data for 2009 from (Claessen, 2010). The 
original data are retrieved from income and wealth tax records and the CBS, Inkomenspanelonderzoek 
(IPO) and Sociaal-Economisch Panelonderzoek (SEP).  
 
 
The Dutch case reflects a pattern which seems to hold for almost all Rhineland welfare 
states: it has maintained a fairly egalitarian income distribution during the last three 
decades of the twentieth century, whereas Anglo-Saxon countries experienced a 
substantial rise in income inequality (Katz and Autor, 1999; Lindert, 2000; Caminada  
and Goudswaard, 2001; Feenstra and Hanson, 2003; Salverda and Atkinson, 2007; 
OECD, 2008). Net disposable income inequality around 2000 in these countries ranged 
between 0.23 and 0.28, that is, below the OECD unweighted average of 0.31. Despite the 
ongoing implementation of neo-liberal reforms since the early 1980s, these countries still 
have encompassing systems of social security guaranteeing a certain minimum level  of 
income to all citizens (Soltow and van Zanden, 1998; Lindert, 2004). But private wealth 
inequality levels do not support the picture of the redistributive welfare state. 
 
Our overview suggests that private wealth inequality in the Rhineland welfare states is 
high. Levels are much higher than could be assumed on the basis of Davies et al. and 
largely comparable to the Anglo-Saxon countries, and also high in a global perspective 
(Davies et al., 2009: Table 9 and appendix V). Furthermore, the discussion of source 
problems, and especially the absence of reliable data on the wealth of the super-rich, does 
not rule out the option that even the higher figures are still underestimations of actual 
levels of private wealth inequality. 
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3. TENTATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE HIGH LEVEL OF WEALTH INEQUALITY IN RHINELAND 
WELFARE STATES 
 
Why is private wealth inequality in Rhineland welfare states so high? In search of 
tentative explanations we focus on factors that may specifically account for the observed 
contrast between low income and high wealth inequality levels. Our hypothesis consists 
of two key components. First, because of the importance of collective arrangements for 
household asset portfolios in welfare states, the concept of ‘private wealth’ misses a 
substantial part of total household wealth in a broader sense. Second, the organization of 
such collective arrangements tends to equalize the income distribution in the Rhineland 
countries via progressive income taxes, but leaves the accumulation of private wealth 
largely untouched.      
 The first component relates to the fact that the concept of ‘private net worth’ does 
not capture the collective and public arrangements that are put in place to guarantee life-
time income security. In Rhineland countries, collective and public funds to a great 
degree secure people against the income risks of old-age, unemployment or incapacity. 
Also, the state tends to support human capital accumulation by providing easy and 
affordable access to education for all strata of society. Part of the ‘inequality’ in the 
private wealth distribution in Rhineland countries is thus compensated by a relative 
egalitarian distribution of the claims to collectively held assets. 
Therefore, the incentive on the part of lower income groups to save in order to 
counter the risk of income losses due to unemployment, illness or old age, is lower than 
in countries without encompassing social security systems. The provision of cheap public 
education of reasonably quality also lowers the propensity to increase household savings 
for education of children, potentially enhancing the inter-generational inequality in 
financial capital accumulation. State-guaranteed income security thus may in part explain 
the large size of negative wealth ownership in the Rhineland welfare states, both in terms 
of the percentage share of net debtors as well as the relative size of their debt. In Sweden, 
for instance, this group comprises 24% of total households, and in Denmark even more. 
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The inclusion of net debtors has a considerable impact on the skewing of the wealth 
distribution (Klein, 2000). It is not clear, however, to what extent the size of negative 
wealth ownership in the Rhineland countries in practice is larger than, for instance, in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The figures assembled in LWS do not indicate a fundamental 
difference: the percentage of households with negative net wealth ownership around 2000 
is also large in Canada (20 %) and the USA (16-19 %), whereas in a Rhineland country 
like Germany this percentage is rather low (9 %, although no less than 29 % reported 
with nil net worth) (Sierminska et al., 2006: p. 31). 
 Where security does play a role is in the decision to save for old age. Of the Dutch 
households in the social economic panel survey of 1988, when asked for their motives to 
save, only 2 percent responded to save for their old age (Alessie and Kapteyn, 1999: pp. 
11-12). People in the Netherlands and other Rhineland countries are clearly counting on 
the encompassing nature of state subsidies for old-age (65+) and the vast collective 
pension schemes to which many employees contribute considerable parts of their labour 
earnings. Taking claims to these funds into account would have an equalizing effect on 
the wealth distribution, since much of it is found with the middling classes, and more 
specifically with the public servants. This effect has been calculated for Finland (2004), 
with its mainly employment-based schemes, and pension rights making up no less than 
47 % of total wealth, and Germany (2007), with its huge pension funds and its pension 
rights with a total present value of 4,590 billion E in 2007, making up 43 % of total 
wealth. In both cases, the effect would decrease the Gini by 16 percentage points (Frick 
and Grabka, 2010; Maunu, 2010). It needs to be stressed, however, that pension wealth is 
more difficult to quantify at an individual level and also forms a different type of wealth, 
since it is not directly accessible to the owner. 
 Welfare policies enhance the incentives for the demand as well as the supply of 
household indebtedness. Low variability of income caused by tight labour regulations and 
extensive social security schemes may induce private risk-taking behavior, but financial 
institutions also have a stronger incentive to supply consumer credits or mortgage loans if 
household incomes are more secure. They ‘help’ people to incur debts at some points in 
their life-cycle, especially when starting a family, buying a house or for consumption 
purposes, especially people in their thirties. This pattern is generally observed, but it is 
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equally found in the Anglo-Saxon countries like the USA and the UK (Sierminska et al., 
2006: p. 34), leaving us again with the question whether this is a distinctive characteristic 
of the Rhineland countries. 
 The extent of private debt-creation may be a relatively new phenomenon. Most of 
the Rhineland countries have built up encompassing systems of social security, including 
old-age income provisions, labour disability insurances and extensive unemployment 
benefits, only after the Second World War. It is therefore only recently that the political 
ideal and the economic practice of state guaranteed ‘life time income security’ has started 
to affect the asset management decisions of households. The changes in the anticipation 
of risk and the different attitude towards incurring debts are arguably affecting mentality 
changes within our own generation, but do only to a lesser extent apply to our parents’ or 
grandparents’ generation. 
 
A second aspect relates to the particularities of the tax regimes that are supporting the 
heavy weight of social security expenditures on government budgets. In Rhineland 
welfare states, these press mainly on labour and consumption, and hardly on wealth, and 
this reduces opportunities for lower income groups to build wealth, while it increases 
opportunities for wealth owners to expand their wealth. The lion’s share of state revenue 
is derived from taxes on income and consumption (V.A.T.). Wealth taxes contribute a 
relatively small share, not exceeding a small percentage of total revenues (see Figure 2). 
Apart from the question whether there is sufficient political leverage to tax wealth, the 
costs of monitoring and levying wealth taxes are higher than in the case of income or 
consumption. Asset mobility has increased in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
which has made it easier to escape wealth taxes. Hence, the rich have clear incentives to 
have part of their income (i.e. the part not needed to fulfil short-term consumption 
desires) paid in the form of company shares or other types of assets, in order to 
subsequently shield them from taxation. 
The declining importance of wealth tax revenue, the difficulties in monitoring and 
possibly also ideological reasons have induced several policy-makers to advocate further 
reductions in wealth taxation and even fuelled propositions to abolish them altogether. 
The taxation of wealth revenue was abolished in Austria in 1994, in Denmark and 
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Germany in 1997 and in the Netherlands in 2001. During the latest tax reform in the 
Netherlands in that year, the capital levy was raised from 0.7 to 1.2%, but at the same 
time taxation of actual wealth revenue was abolished. Previously, the larger wealth 
owners had been paying 60% income tax on income generated from capital or wealth. 
This implies that in the case of an average annual net return of 4% the fiscal rate has 
declined from 3.1% (2.4 + 0.7) to 1.2%.  
In view of the fierce international competition in financial markets, many 
governments, including those of the Rhineland countries, have been pressed to adopt a 
relatively mild fiscal regime for businesses and their capital assets. An analysis of 
changes in the corporate income tax in sixteen countries (part of the EU plus G7) over the 
period 1982 to 2001 shows that the effective average tax rate was reduced substantially, 
that is, more than 20 percentage points, in five of these countries. Of these, four are 
Rhineland countries: Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden (Devereux et al., 2002). In 
part, this is a process of convergence with rates in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and the 
levels reached were broadly similar around 2000, but the Rhineland countries still have to 
fund their welfare systems and therefore need to find other revenues to do so. 
These revenues are hardly found in the realm of property, wealth transfer or 
wealth revenue taxes. Inheritance taxes, for instance, have also been reduced or even 
abolished in most Rhineland countries in the past decades. In 2005, succession taxes in 
the Netherlands amounted to no more than € 1,709 billion or 18% of the € 9,450 billion 
declared and taxed as net wealth inherited that year and no more than 8% of the total 
amount of € 22 billion inherited that year (Gilst et al., 2008). This indicates that wealth 
can be transferred to the next generation to a large extent untouched by taxation. In all 
Western countries, including both the Rhineland and Anglo-Saxon types, the weight of 
inheritance taxes has shrunk to insignificance since the 1970s and makes up only a very 
small share of total state revenues, usually lower than 1 % (Bertocchi, 2011). Inheritances 
can result in lower wealth inequality (Wolff, 2002), especially when distributed among 
many children, but this inter-generational effect has decreased as a result of declining 
birth rates, while wealth can now be transferred to the next generation relatively 
unaffected by taxation. 
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Figure 2 
Taxes on property as percentage of GDP, 2006 
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Source: OECD (2008) Revenue Statistics 1965-2007 
Notes: The taxes refer to category 4000 in the OECD revenue statistics; it includes recurrent taxes on 
immovable property, recurrent taxes on net wealth, estate, inheritance and gift taxes, taxes on financial and 
capital transactions and other (non-) recurrent taxes on property.  
 
 
The supposed inefficiency of wealth taxation cannot alone explain why income and 
consumption in the Rhineland countries are increasingly targeted instead of wealth. 
Figure 2 shows that Rhineland countries in general tend to tax property less than Anglo-
Saxon countries such as the US, UK and Australia. As a percentage share of GDP the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, with the exception of New Zealand, tend to tax wealth at least 
twice as heavily as the average Rhineland welfare state. Also compared to the OECD 
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Total (2.0) or the EU15 (2.2), the Rhineland countries remain below average. In other 
words, the Rhineland welfare states tend to base the additional tax effort required to 
maintain the supply of social security and collective goods, on income and consumption, 
but certainly not on private wealth.    
There is another set of factors or conditions that are not primarily of a political or 
fiscal nature, but relate to the absence of major political-military shocks in Western 
Europe during the past six decades. In many of these countries, the First World War 
produced a decisive trend break in wealth inequality, which coincided with rapidly 
changing political ideas about the value of wealth and income redistribution. A similar 
reduction in wealth inequality occurred as a result of the great depression of the early 
1930s and the Second World War. Generally, these wars and crises destroyed large 
amounts of capital and the rich were hit relatively hard (Piketty and Saez, 2006; Atkinson 
and Piketty, 2007). But the absence of such shocks in the second half of the twentieth 
century allowed wealth to grow undisturbed. 
 Finally, we should not overlook the possibility that wealth inequality in the 
Rhineland welfare states has increased substantially in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. For countries for which comparable data is available for longer periods, 
including Germany and Sweden, this has indeed been demonstrated (Frick and Grabka, 
2009; Roine and Waldenström, 2009). It has already been suggested that increasing asset 
mobility since the 1980s has contributed to the evasion and relaxation of wealth taxation. 
But the unprecedented rises in the value of stocks and real estate are also likely to have 
affected the wealth distribution over the past three to four decades more profoundly than 
they have affected the income distribution. These categories of wealth are especially 
over-represented in the asset portfolios of the rich. It is generally assumed that there is a 
positive relationship between stock price developments and the share of wealth owned by 
the super-rich, because the latter tend to hold a disproportionally large share of their 
wealth in company shares (Jäntti, 2006; Torche and Spilerman, 2008: p. 167), and these 
are taxed only at a low rate and to an ever smaller extent. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This research note has looked more closely into the relationship between income and 
wealth inequality across countries, and argues that Rhineland welfare states at the turn of 
the millennium characteristically combine low income inequality with high private wealth 
inequality. We have illustrated this by combining the most recent case studies on wealth 
inequality and observing levels of private wealth inequality at a Gini of around 0.80, 
which is much higher than assumed in the literature and also quite high from a global 
perspective. 
It is hypothesized that the large contrast between income and wealth inequality 
levels is the result of a combination of economic conditions, developments, policy 
measures and structural characteristics of Rhineland model countries. The great number 
of credit facilities, its favourable treatment of businesses, the life-long social security and 
public social and pension schemes, and a relatively mild wealth tax regime all contribute 
to the inequality potential of the wealth distribution. The effect and relative weight of 
these elements needs to be further assessed. What is clear, however, is that whereas the 
redistribution of income has remained fairly strong in Rhineland welfare states to date, 
households have much more freedom to dispose of their wealth assets as they prefer. In 
the wake of increasing constraints on wealth taxation (monitoring costs, asset mobility, 
ideological considerations) wealth became ever less taxed over the decades from 1980 - 
witness the reduction of the wealth, dividend and succession taxes in several Rhineland 
countries. This process is likely to proceed further in the coming years, as indicated by 
the current debate about further reducing or abolishing these taxes in the same countries. 
 In this research note we have looked at the opportunity to infer private wealth 
inequality estimates from the far more abundantly available income inequality figures. 
For several Rhineland countries this method proved to create a bias of nearly 15 
percentage points of a Gini. This result has wider implications. It points, for instance, to 
the possibility that for many developing countries with high income inequality, the 
inferred wealth inequality figures will be far too high. Our argument that the size and 
 17 
impact of negative net wealth on the wealth distribution is largely related to the income 
security of people and the willingness of financial institutions to supply credit beyond the 
value of household’s collateral, applies to developing countries in the other direction: 
without social security systems, households have to save in order to secure their levels of 
living standards throughout their life-cycles and wealth accumulation among the poor is a 
strategy to survive. If it is indeed true that net negative wealth is much less common in 
developing countries, this will have a serious negative impact on their comparative level 
of wealth inequality. This qualifies the idea of Davies et al. (Davies et al., 2009) to infer 
wealth inequality estimates from the far more abundantly available income inequality 
figures; we would rather advocate an approach starting from different sets of countries 
with specific socio-economic characteristics. We would also like to stress, however, how 
important the contribution of Davies et al. is. The great value added of adopting a global 
perspective as they do, is that it brings up questions, such as those concerning the 
relationship between income and wealth inequality, that have not been posed in similar 
ways before. This note is therefore in many respects a fruit of their seminal work.      
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